With the European Union (EU) being the predominant external actor in the Balkans, this post shall elaborate on the Union’s relations with the region, expounding upon the Union’s views and perspectives on the region. In doing so, this post adopts a critical lens based on the article by Barbé & Johansson-Nogués (2008) that questioned the seemingly self-serving characteristics of an EU policy that was envisioned to be a ‘force for good’ for their neighbors.
At present, the EU is comprised of 28 member states and has a large presence in the Balkans since 1996 with the establishment of the EU Delegation. Today, the EU Delegation to Bosnia and Herzegovina located at the EU House comprises more than 150 staff along with the Head of the Delegation and EU Special Representative, Ambassador Wigemark. Visiting them on 28th May gave us an insight into the influence of the EU and their key priorities relating to reconciliation and the region’s accession into the Union. Ms Dzenana, a Political Adviser in the EU, was our host for that afternoon where she fielded our questions regarding the EU’s work in the region that followed her sharing.
During the visit, what stood out was the recurrent footnoting of the issues that were hampering BiH’s accession into the EU. The initiation of the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) was meant to bring states such as BiH towards the route of EU integration, with BiH opening the negotiations in 2005. However, after 14 years, this process has still yet to conclude, with a lack of political will to enact changes that are in line with the EU's requirements being an outstanding concern. Ms Dzenana subsequently alluded to shortcomings in areas like Human Rights, Public Procurement, Export Certification, Anti-Corruption and even Environmental Protection that were recognized as barriers towards the accession of the region into the EU. By saying that the EU will not change the “rules of the game” to suit the ex-Yugoslavian states, the region simply has to either comply and change, or see EU integration as yet another far-fetched goal to meet.
As seen in the image above, the “EU acquis chapters” are meant to be opened and negotiated between the state and the EU, with the standards and ideals being admittedly ambitious for the Balkan states. Hence, the EU seems to have in place a system of progressive guidance imparting both economic and technical aid to facilitate the transition and restructuring required. With a road map and ’stairway’ drawn up, any positive progress along this ‘stairway’, albeit incremental, would signal a greater likelihood of EU integration for the state.
An area of immense concern from the EU’s perspective is that of political will. In BiH, their political system is extremely complex and appears to divide the community along both ethnic and religious lines. The political leaders of the country, as mentioned by Dr Damir of the University of Sarajevo, comprises 6-7 men who have “no intent to work together on anything”. With the country’s elections also been based on whose proposal has the highest appeal to a particular ethnic group, the ethno-territorial division of the country becomes further reinforced and entrenched, to the extent where areas supposedly belonging to the Rep. of Srpska proudly fly the Serbian flag.
Along with the divided political system where decisions are not made in the ‘best’ interests of the country, other issues such as human rights and the levels of corruption seem to make BiH’s accession into the EU with adherence to the “4 Freedoms” even more unlikely. Additionally, as noted by Ms Dzenana, for the political leaders to consolidate and retain power, they ‘must’ continue to divide BiH along ethno-religious lines. With this consideration in mind, few elected leaders are incentivised to prioritise any concrete reforms in public administration, further hampering the country’s ability to “Transpose and Approximate” much of its laws to the legislation of the EU.
Apart from the internal factors and political will mentioned by Ms Dzenana, the blame was also shifted onto other exogenous sources of influence in the region. Primarily, the Chinese, Russians and other state and suprationational bodies that finance and provide soft loans to support the region’s infrastructure and energy projects were placed under the microscope. These projects, according to the EU, were not financed with as strict a “Terms & Conditions” as compared to those originating from EU nations. These projects, if proceeded with, were seen as the Region’s way of circumventing the tight EU regulations present - which obviously were frowned upon by the EU which values compliance to regulations and standards as strict criteria for accession.
With loans and infrastructural investments serving as a political tool for some countries, it must be acknowledged that any source of EU money is likely to have political strings attached too. Moreover, other non-EU sources of funding for economic progress and development also can entail several attached ‘strings’. With Ms Dzenana noting the potential ‘security umbrella’ that the EU and any subsequent NATO membership application may provide, any vestiges of the Cold War between the West and the Soviets might play out in the region with Russia similarly seeking to reinforce its sphere of influence in and around Europe. Going back to the article by Barbé & Johansson-Nogués (2008), where the EU’s claim to be a ‘positive force’ was critiqued amidst biases in policy implementation and their attempts to ‘promote democracy’, wider geopolitical tensions then seem to be at play here.
Additionally, an interesting observation noted was that Britain, amidst Brexit, supports further EU enlargement to encompass the Western Balkans. Although ironic that a country attempting to leave the EU - supposedly because of the Union’s flaws - is strongly recommending that the Balkans be accepted, the UK example further reinforces Barbé & Johansson-Nogués’s (2008) argument by taking on similar a macro, long-term view. This is likely to be so as even though the region may not be as stable as desired before it enters the EU, it is calculated to be much better than to have the region susceptible to further Chinese or Russian influence. This fear is not entirely unfounded with Prof. Markovic from the University of Belgrade, sharing at the Belgrade Fortress that projects undertaken under by the Chinese were completed much faster and done more cost-effectively than if they were constructed and financed by EU states such as Germany.
These displays of efficiency and cost-effectiveness further sways public perception towards a positive view of China, and potentially leads to China-leaning political parties entering the fray or gaining traction - which is politically counter-productive on the ground for a potential EU member state.
Finally, even with these other sources of external influence, the EU has still been presented as a boon rather than bane for the region. Ms Dzenana also presents the EU in a positive light with social and economic mobility further dangled as carrots for entering the EU. With BiH’s accession, the common market and better remunerations, facilitated by the “Freedom of movement of workers” (Chapter 2 of the Acquis) would accelerate the flow of individuals from south-eastern Europe towards countries like Germany and Austria in search of jobs which pay significantly better than if sought within the region. While positive for the EU economy and for the individuals who are earning more, the response by Ms Dzenana to a question about the region’s ongoing ‘brain drain’ - that seemed to be partly inspired by Prof Markovic’s pessimism - was answered by making brief mention to the presence and thus potential of “return flow” migration was observed in Poland after their entry into the EU. This presentation of a counter-narrative to Prof Markovic’s blatant dismissal of any possibility that it may happen could be seen as the EU intentionally portraying itself still as a ‘force for good’ and possibly the ‘only way’ forward for the region.
Prima facie, BiH and the region seem to be “irreversibly on track towards EU membership” – which is one of the EU Delegation’s missions – with supposedly no better options available and EU integration depicted as a bright future to aspire towards. Significantly, by ending with a possible counter-argument to the rosy image and ‘inevitability’ of this region’s accession, this thought will be further explored in the subsequent posts with reference to the perspectives of students and academics, businesses, local authorities and other organisations on the role of the EU and other external actors in the region. This divergence of perspectives, as will be further presented, then illustrates how any progress in the Balkans could be that tough to achieve.
References
Barbé, E., & Johansson-Nogués, E. (2008). The EU as a modest 'force for good': The european neighbourhood policy. International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), 84(1), 81-96. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2346.2008.00690.x
Written by Donovan Liew